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This Article examines judicial review of state action by international courts, in particular
inter-American institutions.
ARTICLES




On July 29, 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (the "Court") pronounced its first judgment in a con-
tentious proceeding.' The case of Angel Manfredo Velaisquez
Rodriguez ("Velisquez Rodriguez") was submitted to the
Court by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(the "Commission"), based on a 1981 petition filed against the
government of Honduras. The Court's judgment unanimously
found that Honduras had violated the rights of personal lib-
erty, humane treatment, and life, guaranteed by the American
Convention of Human Rights (the "Convention" or the
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., 1967, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1970, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
1. See Velisquez Rodriguez Case, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS [INTER-AM. CT. H.R.] 35, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13
(1988). In an earlier case submitted by Costa Rica, the Court declined to proceed
because the Inter-American Commission had not first considered the matter. See
Matter of Viviana Gallardo, No. G. 101/81, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (Decision of Nov. 13,
1981). In addition to these two cases, the Court has issued nine advisory opinions.
See Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Advisory Opinion No. OC-9/87, IN-
TER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 9 (1987); Habeas Corpus in
Emergency Situations, Advisory Opinion No. OC-8/87, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDG-
MENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 8 (1987); Enforceability of the Right to Reply or
Correction, Advisory Opinion No. OC-7/86, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND
OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 7 (1986); The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion No. OC-6/86, INTER-AM. CT. H.R.
JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 6 (1986); Compulsory Membership in an Asso-
ciation Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Advisory Opinion No. OC-
5/85, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 5 (1985); Proposed
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Ad-
visory Opinion No. OC-4/84, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A)
No. 4 (1984); Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory Opinion No. OC-3/83, IN-
TER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 3 (1983); The Effect of Res-
ervations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention, Advisory Opinion No.
OC-2/82, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 2 (1982), re-
printed in 22 I.L.M. 37 (1983); "Other Treaties" Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction
of the Court, Advisory Opinion No. OC-1/82, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND
OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 1 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 51 (1983).
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"American Convention"),2 and decided that Honduras must
pay fair compensation to the victim's next-of-kin.
The Court's judgment is significant both in its articulation
of the law of state responsibility for human rights violations
and for the process by which the Court arrived at its conclu-
sions. During the proceedings, the Court determined, inter
alia, the scope and standard of its review, issues concerning the
admissibility and weight of evidence, and the burden and de-
gree of proof. This article will discuss the procedural aspects
of the case, comparing the Inter-American Court's treatment
of judicial review and evidentiary matters with that of other
permanent international tribunals: the International Court of
Justice (the "ICJ"), 4 the European Court of Human Rights (the
"ECHR"), 5 and the European Court ofJustice (the "ECJ").6 It
2. American Convention on Human Rights, OEA/ser. K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev.
1, corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention].
Nineteen states members of the Organization of American States have ratified the
Convention: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See ORG. OF AM. STATES, HAND-
BOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYS-
TEM, OEA/ser.L./V./II.65, doc. 6 (1985) [hereinafter HANDBOOK). The United States
is a signatory, but not a state party. See President's Message to the Senate Transmit-
ting Human Rights Treaties, PUB. PAPERS, Feb. 23, 1978, at 395.
3. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 76, 194. The Court did not fix the
amount of damages because the parties submitted no evidence on the issue. Id. In-
stead, it decided that Honduras and the Commission should agree on the amount of
damages and present their agreement to the Court for approval. Id. The parties
were unable to reach agreement and the matter is pending before the Court. Tele-
phone interview with Professor Claudio Grossman, American University, Washing-
ton College of Law, Washington, D.C., Adviser for the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (May 8, 1989).
4. The ICJ is the judicial organ of the United Nations. Its jurisdiction comprises
all cases referred to it by states parties or pursuant to treat), or through acceptance in
advance of the jurisdiction of the Court. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30 [hereinafter
ICJ Statute].
5. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955) [hereinafter European Convention],
established both the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights. The commission's functions are to receive applications con-
cerning victims, review them for admissibility, and attempt a "friendly settlement" if
the petition is found to be admissible. The commission undertakes fact-finding and,
if necessary, investigations of the petition's allegations. Id. art. 28, 213 U.N.T.S. at
238-40. Ifa friendly settlement is not reached, the commission draws up a report on
the facts and its opinion as to whether a violation of the Convention has been estab-
lished. Id. art. 31, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240. Either the commission or a state party that
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will point out where the Inter-American Court has developed
or refined international rules of evidence to meet the particular
concerns of human rights litigation. It concludes by affirming
the need, implicitly recognized in this case, to balance the
traditional principle of flexibility in international evidentiary
has accepted the court's jurisdiction may submitrthe matter to the court after com-
mission proceedings have been completed. Id. art. 44, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246. As of
January 1988, 144 cases had been submitted to the court. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 94-98 (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter STOCK-TAKING]. The
commission and the court each contain a number of members equal to the number of
states parties to the convention, currently twenty-one. Those states are Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. On the European
Convention in general, see F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (1974); S. ERCMAN, GUIDE TO CASE LAW (1981); F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1975); Z. NEDJATI, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE EURO-
PEAN CONVENTION (1978); A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (2d ed. 1977);
see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, BIBLIOGRAPHY RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1978). Concerning procedures under the European Convention,
see O'Boyle, Practice and Procedure Under the European Convention on Human Rightts, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 697 (1980). For an overview of the European Court, see Bos-
suyt & Vanden Bosch, Judges and Judglents: 25 Years of Judicial ActivitV of the Court of
Strasbourg, 1984-1985 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 695.
6. The European Court of Justice (the "ECJ") is the tribunal of the European
Coal and Steel Community (the "ECSC"), the European Economic Community (the
"EEC"), and the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). See Protocol on
the Statute of the Court ofJustice of the European Economic Community, Apr. 17,
1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) at 141 (official English version), 298
U.N.T.S. 147 (unofficial English trans.); Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) at '1 (official
English version), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) at 162 (official English version), 298
U.N.T.S. 167 (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter Euratom Treaty]; Treaty Institut-
ing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
2 (Cmd. 5189) at I (official English version), 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (unofficial English
trans.) [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. The Court's powers include direct review of Com-
munity action pursuant to article 173 of the EEC Treaty and indirect control through
cases referred for review by national courts under article 177 of the same treaty. The
Court's jurisdiction is not defined exclusively by the treaties, but also by provisions in
other agreements, conventions, and protocols. See K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE 3 (1984). The Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), autho-
rizes creation of a court of first instance to hear and determine certain claims, actions,
or proceedings brought by natural or legal persons. There will be a right of appeal
to the European Court of Justice on points of law only. See EEC Treaty, supra, art.
168a, added by Single European Act, supra, art. 11, at 6; Euratom Treaty, supra, art.
140, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 202, 298 U.N.T.S. at 213; ECSC Treaty, supra, art.
32d, added by Single European Act, supra, art. 4, at 4.
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matters with some degree of predictability of international
tribunals as investigatory, as well as adjudicatory, bodies.
I. IVTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS
Since 1948, the Inter-American system of the Organiza-
tion of American States (the "OAS") has developed ambitious
and effective mechanisms for the promotion and protection of
human rights. The legal documents of the system7 recognize
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.' They es-
tablish the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 9 and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.' ° The Commis-
7. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2416, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 721 U.N.T.S. 326 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. The Inter-American
system has two legal sources, one of which is the OAS Charter. Id. The other is the
American Convention. See supra note 2. In addition, certain subsidiary documents
are legally binding. See Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (1980, modified 1985) [hereinafter Inter-Am. Commission Regulations], re-
printed in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 115-42; Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights (1980) [hereinafter Inter-Am. Court Rules], reprinted in
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 155-74; Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (1979) [hereinafter Inter-Am. Court Statute], reprinted in HANDBOOK, slipra
note 2, at 143-54; Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(1979) [hereinafter Inter-Am. Commission Statute], reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note
2, at 103-13; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) [hereinaf-
ter American Declaration], reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 17-25. On the legal
status of the American Declaration, see Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the
Protection of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 833-36 (1975).
8. See American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3-26, at 2-9, reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
at 676-83; American Declaration, supra note 7, arts. I-XXVIII, reprinted in HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 20-25.
9. See OAS Charter, supra note 7, arts. 51(e), 112, 150, 21 U.S.T. at 674, 691,
701, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, at 68, 85, 95, 721 U.N.T.S. at 342, 364-66, 376; American
Convention, supra note 2, arts. 33-34, at 11, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 685. The OAS
General Assembly elects the seven members of the Commission in an individual ca-
pacity to a term of four years. OAS Charter, supra note 7, art. 51(e), 21 U.S.T. at 674,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847, at 68, 721 U.N.T.S. at 342; American Convention, supra note 2,
art. 37, at 11, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 685. The Commission represents all member
states of the OAS as both an organ of the OAS and of the Convention. OAS Charter,
supra note 7, art. 112, 21 U.S.T. at 691, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, at 85, 721 U.N.T.S. at 364-
66. The Commission functions to promote the observance and protection of human
rights. It also serves as a consultative organ of the organization in human rights
matters. See id.; see also American Convention, supra note 2, art. 41, at 12, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. at 686; Shelton, Implementation Procedures of the American Convention oii Human
Rights, 26 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 238 (1983).
10. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 33, at 11, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at
685. The Court consists of seven judges nominated from among nationals of the
member states of the OAS. Id. art. 52, at 16, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 690. Judges are
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sion may review complaints from individuals and groups or it-
self initiate proceedings concerning human rights violations by
any OAS member state." The Commission may also under-
take country-wide studies of human rights practices and make
on-site investigations.'
2
The Court may hear cases between states parties to the
Convention or against a state at the request of the Commission
if the state involved has accepted the Court's jurisdiction. 13
The Court may award damages and take provisional measures
when necessary. 14
elected to the Court in an "individual capacity" by a vote of the states parties to the
Convention. Id. The Judges of the Court are to be "of the highest moral authority,"
"of recognized competence in the field of human rights," and must "possess the
qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial functions" in the state
of nationality or of the state that nominates them. Id. The judges are elected for a
term of six years and "may be reelected only once." Id. art. 54, at 16, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. at 690; see Inter-Am. Court Statute, supra note 7, arts. 18-20, reprinted in HAND-
BOOK, supra note 2, at 150-51; Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
76 AM.J. INT'L L. 231 (1982).
11. See American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 44-45, at 13, reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
at 687. The Inter-American system is unique in making the right of individual peti-
tion automatic and inter-state proceedings optional. Id.; see Inter-Am. Commission
Regulations, supra note 7, art. 26, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 125; Inter-
Am. Commission Statute, supra note 7, arts. 18-20, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note
2, at 109-11; Norris, The Individual Petition Procedure of the Inter-Anierican System for the
Protection of Human Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 117
(H. Hannum ed. 1986); Norris, Bringing Human Rights Petitions Before the Inter-Anerican
Commission, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 733 (1980).
12. See Inter-Am. Commission Regulations, supra note 7, art. 62, reprinted in
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 137-38; Inter-Am. Commission Statute, supra note 7, arts.
18(c), (g), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at .109-10. To date, the Commission
has published country reports concerning Cuba (1962, 1963, 1967, 1970, 1977,
1979, 1983); the Dominican Republic (1965, 1966); Haiti (1969, 1979); Honduras
(1970); Chile (1974, 1976, 1977, 1985); Panama (1978); Nicaragua (1978, 1981,
1984); Paraguay (1978); Uruguay (1978); El Salvador (1970, 1978); Argentina
(1980); Colombia (1981); Guatemala (1981, 1983, 1985); Bolivia (1981); and Suri-
name (1983, 1985). See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 192-94. For a discussion of the
effectiveness of on-site investigations, see Norris, Observations In Loco: Practice and
Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1979-1983, 19 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 285 (1984); Norris, Observations In Loco: Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 46 (1980); Shelton, 'tilization of Fact-
Finding .Missions to Promote and Protect Human Rights: The Chile Case, 2 HuM. RTS. L.J. 1
(1981).
13. See American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 61(1), 62(3), at 17-18, reprinted
in 9 I.L.M. at 691-92. The Court also has the most extensive advisory jurisdiction of
any international tribunal. See Buergenthal, The Advisorv Practice of the Inter-Anterican
Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1985).
14. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 63(l)-(2), at 18, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. at 692.
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II. THE VELASQUEZ RODRIGUEZ CASE
According to the 1981 petition filed with the Commission
and supplementary information received later, VelAsquez Rod-
riguez was a student at the National Autonomous University of
Honduras when he disappeared. 15 He was allegedly kid-
napped and detained without a warrant for his arrest by mem-
bers of the National Office of Investigations (the "DNI") and
G-2 of the Armed Forces of Honduras.' 6 During his detention
he was taken to various locations where he was interrogated
and tortured.' 7
The Commission considered the VelAsquez Rodriguez
case over a five-year period. It sought to obtain information
from the government to determine the truth of the facts al-
leged.' 8 The Commission concluded its proceedings on April
18, 1986, finding the evidence showed VelAsquez Rodriguez to
be missing and that Honduras "has not offered convincing
proof that would allow the Commission to determine that the
allegations are not true." 19
On April 24, 1986, the Commission submitted the case to
the Court. 2° The government responded by entering prelimi-
nary objections to the Court's jurisdiction.2  The Court heard
15. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 36, 1 3, OAS/ser.
L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Commission received the petition on October 7, 1981, and communi-
cated the relevant parts to the government for response. Id. 4. The Commission
tried on several occasions to obtain information, but the government failed to reply.
Id. After nearly two years, the Commission applied article 42 of its regulations and
presumed the truth of the uncontested allegations. Id. at 35-36, 1 1-4; see also infra
note 58. One month later, on November 18, 1983, the government asked for recon-
sideration on the grounds that domestic remedies had not been exhausted. Id. 5.
The Commission reopened the proceedings and sought further information from the
government. Id. at 36-37, 6. The government filed responses in October 1985 and
April 1986. Id. at 37, $$ 8-9. The Commission, by Resolution 22/86 of April 18,
1986, deemed the responses inadequate and, in a final decision, "reaffirmed" the
1983 resolution presuming the truth of the facts alleged. Id. 10.
19. Id. The government's evidence consisted of the results of an investigatory
commission set up to study the matter as well as a decision of the First Criminal
Court, which dismissed the complaints filed against persons allegedly responsible for
the disappearance of Vel~isquez Rodriguez Id. 14 7-9.
20. Id. 12.
21. Id. at 38, 16; see also Inter-Am. Court Rules, supra note 7, art. 27, reprinted in
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 165 (procedure for filing preliminary objections).
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argument on the objections on June 15, 1987,22 and unani-
mously rejected them, except for those relating to the issue of
exhaustion of domestic legal remedies, which were joined to
the merits of the case.23 In that same order, the Court set a
schedule for the filing of memorials and offers of proof, "with
an indication of the facts that each item of evidence is intended
to prove. '24 The government and Commission were also or-
dered to indicate "how, when and under what circumstances"
each wished to present its evidence.25 The Court subsequently
admitted all testimonial and documentary evidence offered by
both the Commission and the government.2 6
Hearings on the merits of the case took place between
September 30 and October 7, 1987. The Court heard argu-
ments by agents for the Commission and the government. In
addition, the Commission called a series of witnesses for three
purposes. The first group testified about the general situation
in Honduras between 1981 and 1984 regarding disappear-
ances and the government's complicity in them.27 The second
group testified as to the existence of effective domestic reme-
dies. 28 Finally, two witnesses testified on the specific facts re-
lating to Velisquez Rodriguez.29
After hearing all the witnesses, the Court ordered the sub-
mission of additional documentary and testimonial evidence,
including testimony by two members of the Honduran army.
It also ordered Honduras to locate a missing witness.3 0 The
government responded by requesting that the ordered testi-
22. Prior to the hearing, on March 20, 1987, the Commission filed a "motion"
together with its observations, asking that the date set for oral argument on the pre-
liminary objections be rescinded. The Court denied the motion without a statement
of reasons. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 39, 4 20-22. This procedure
is noteworthy because none of the Court's basic texts refer to the existence or filing
of motions, nor is the term used in any of the prior opinions of the Court. It is
similarly absent from the texts of other international tribunals.
23. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 55, 96, OEA/ser.
L./V./III. 17, doc. 13 (1987) (preliminary objections) [hereinafter Preliminary Objec-
tions].
24. V'eldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 39, 24.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 40, 27.
27. Id. at 41, 28(c).
28. Id. 28(d).
29. Id. 28(e).
30. Id. at 42, 1 29(c)(1).
1989]
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mony be heard in a closed hearing, for national security rea-
sons. The Court acceded to the government's request over the
objections of the Commission and, in a closed session attended
by both parties, heard the two army officers as well as the head
of the Honduran intelligence services.31
Subsequent to the hearing, while the case remained pend-
ing, the Court was obligated to issue two interim protective
measures requested by the Commission as a result of threats
made against certain witnesses and the murders of others.3
The Court issued its judgment on the merits on July 29,
1988.13 It concluded that existing remedies in Honduras dur-
ing the period in question were ineffective,
because the imprisonment was clandestine; formal require-
ments made them inapplicable in practice; the authorities
against whom they were brought simply ignored them, or
because attorneys and judges were threatened and intimi-
dated by those authorities.34
On the merits, the Court found that from 1981 to 1984
between 100 and 150 persons disappeared in Honduras under
similar circumstances. 5  In regard to the kidnappings, "[i]t
was public and notorious knowledge in Honduras that the
31. Id. 32-34.
32. The January 15 order, referring to attacks on witnesses as "savage, primi-
tive, inhuman and reprehensible," demanded that the Honduran government
adopt, without delay, such measures as are necessary to prevent further in-
fringements on the basic rights of those who have appeared or have been
summoned to do so before this Court ... in strict compliance with the obli-
gation of respect for and observance of human rights, under the terms of
Article 1(1) of the Convention.
Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 25, 26, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc.
13 (1988) (Interim Protection Order of Jan. 15). The same order required the gov-
ernment to investigate and punish the threats against and murders of witnesses. Id.
On January 18, 1988, following a public hearing, the Court decided on further meas-
ures, requiring the Honduran government report to the Court the specific steps
taken to protect witnesses and investigate crimes against them. The Court included a
demand for medical and forensic reports on those witnesses who had been killed.
Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 27, 28, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc.
13 (1988) (Interim Protection Order ofJan. 19). The.government submitted autopsy
and forensic reports to the Court within two weeks. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 45-46, 46. Further documentation, including autopsy and ballistic re-
ports, was submitted by the government the following month. Id.
33. 'eldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 35.
34. Id. at 52, 80.
35. Id. at 63-66, 147.
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kidnappings were carried out by military personnel or the po-
"136lice, or persons acting under their orders ....
The Court further found that Velisquez Rodriguez was
kidnapped under circumstances falling within the systematic
practice of disappearances, that persons connected with the
armed forces or under its direction carried out the kidnap-
ping,37 and that there was no evidence that Velisquez Rodri-
guez disappeared "to join subversive groups."38 Therefore,
the Court concluded, Honduran officials either carried out or
acquiesced in the kidnapping, resulting in a failure by the gov-
ernment "to guarantee the human rights affected by" disap-
pearances.9
The Court held that it is a principle of international law
that the state is responsible for the acts and omissions of its
agents undertaken in their official capacity, even if they are act-
ing outside the scope of their authority or in violation of inter-
nal law.4° Intent or motivation is irrelevant. 4'
The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to pre-
vent human rights violations and to use the means at its dis-
posal to carry out a serious investigation of violations com-
mitted within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible,
to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the
victim adequate compensation.42
Where human rights violations are committed by private
parties and not seriously investigated, those parties "are aided
in a sense by the government, thereby making the State re-
sponsible on the international plane. ' '43 In conclusion:
The Court is convinced, and has so. found, that the disap-
pearance of Manfredo Velisquez was carried out by agents
who acted under cover of public authority. However, even
had that fact not been proven, the failure of the State appa-
ratus to act, which is clearly proven, is a failure on the part
of Honduras to fulfill the duties it assumed under Article
36. Id. at 64, 147(c).
37. Id. at 65, 147(o.
38. Id. at 65-66, 147(h).
39. Id. at 66, 1 148.
40. Id. at 70, 170.
41. Id. at 71, 173.
42. Id. 174.
43. Id. at 72, 177.
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1 (1) of the Convention, which obligated it it [sic] to ensure
Manfredo Velisquez the free and full exercise of his human
rights.44
III. EVIDENTIARY AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Standard and Scope of Review
Like other international tribunals, the Inter-American
Court may investigate as well as judge cases submitted to it. 45
However, unlike other international tribunals, except the
ECHR, the Court entertains cases only upon the conclusion of
proceedings before a commission. 6 In both the Inter-Ameri-
can and European systems, the commission normally makes
findings of fact, gives opinions on issues of law, and concludes
whether or not the respondent state has violated one or more
protected human rights."7 In this situation, the courts neces-
sarily review not only state action, but their respective commis-
44. Id. at 73, 182.
45. See Inter-Am. Court Rules, supra note 7, arts. 34-35, reprinted in HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 167; ICJ Statute, supra note 4, arts. 49-50, 59 Stat. at 1062, T.S. No.
993, at 32; European Court of Human Rights, Revised Rules of Court, Rule 40
(1982) [hereinafter Eur. Ct. H.R. Revised Rules]; European Court ofJustice, Rules of
Procedure, arts. 45-52, O.J. C 39/1, at 13-15 (1982) [hereinafter ECJ Rules ofProce-
dure]. The two functions represent a combination of common law and civil law tradi-
tions. For a comparison of procedural aspects of common law and civil law tribunals,
see Deik, The Place of the "Case" in the Common and the Civil Law. 8 TUL. L. REV. 337
(1933-34). For a brief discussion of the civil law impact on the European Court of
Justice, see K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 6, at 255.
46. See supra notes 5, 9-14, and accompanying text. Although it has not yet hap-
pened, in certain cases the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ") might review
findings and determinations by international commissions or committees. See, e.g.,
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
openedforsignature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 22, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 236-38 [hereinafter Racial
Convention] (providing that "[a]ny dispute between two or more States Parties with
respect to the interpretation or application of [the] Convention, which is not settled
by negociation or by the procedures expressly provided for in [the] Convention" may
be referred to the ICJ). The Racial Convention's procedures involve a supervisory
body, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Id. arts. 8-14, 660
U.N.T.S. at 224-32. Similarly, the European Court of Justice may review the deci-
sions and recommendations of Community institutions as well as hear disputes be-
tween states parties submitted by special agreement. See EEC Treaty, supra note 6,
arts. 173, 182, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 57, 59, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76, 78;
Euratom Treaty, supra note 6, art. 154, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 204, 298
U.N.T.S. at 216; ECSC Treaty, snpra note 6, arts. 33, 89, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2, at
31, 85, 261 U.N.T.S. at 167, 223; G. BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAl, CONTROL OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 125-39 (1981).
47. See supra notes 5, 1I.
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sions' findings and conclusions as well.48 The courts, thus,
have aspects in common with both trial and appellate tribu-
nals. To the extent that their judicial review has a partly appel-
late character, they face issues of scope and standard of review
uncommon in tribunals that hear cases at first instance. Specif-
ically, the Inter-American and European courts must decide
what deference, if any, is due their commissions' determina-
tions.
In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court reviewed
de novo all question of fact and law.49 The Commission ar-
gued against this, claiming that Commission decisions on ad-
missibility of petitions should be given conclusive effect.5" The
Court held that the Convention gives the Court full jurisdic-
tion over all issues relevant to a case and that it is not bound by
what the Commission previously may have decided.5  The
Court stressed that it is institutionally separate, the sole judi-
cial organ in the system, and does not act as a court of appeal
in relation to the Commission.52
The Court's de novo consideration of issues of law is
clearly correct, because the Commission is, essentially, not a
judicial body. Although both the Commission and the Court
supervise implementation of human rights obligations by
states parties, it is the Court whose stated purpose is the appli-
48. Id.
49. Preliminary Objections, supra note 23, at 41, 28. De novo review means
trying the matter anew, the same as if it had not been heard before and as if no
decision had been previously rendered. See, e.g., Exner v. FBI, 612 F.2d 1202, 1209
(9th Cir. 1980).
50. Preliminary Objections, supra note 23, at 41, 28. Similar arguments were
made to the European Court of Human Rights and were similarly rejected. See, e.g.,
Case of Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, 32 (1978); Ringeisen Case, 13 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36, 82 (1971); DeWilde, Ooms and Versyp Cases ("Va-
grancy" Cases), 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28, 44 (1970). The European Court's
assumption ofjurisdiction is justified as "simply ascertaining whether the conditions
allowing it to deal with the merits of the case are satisfied." Airey Case, 32 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 10, 17 (1979).
51. Preliminary Ojections, supra note 23, at 41, 29. Similarly, in the Klass and
!'agrac
'
l cases, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that once a case is
referred to it, "the Court is endowed with full jurisdiction and may take cognisance of
all questions of fact or of law arising in the course of the proceedings, including
questions which may have been raised before the Commission under the head of
admissibility." Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17, 32; see Vagrancy, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 29,
49-50.
52. Preliminary Ojections, supra note 23, at 41, 29.
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cation and interpretation of the American Convention.13  In
contrast, the main function of the Commission is "to promote
respect for and defense of human rights. ' 54  The Commis-
sion's work in investigating and considering petitions is one of
many significant and varied tasks accorded it.55 The difference
in the roles of the Court and Commission is further reflected in
the composition of the two bodies: Members of the Court
must be jurists who possess the qualifications required to exer-
cise the highest judicial functions under national law, while
members of the Commission are required to "be persons of
high moral character and recognized competence in the field
of human rights."' 56  The Commission itself recognized the
Court's duty to develop and apply the law of the system, as
reflected in Commission requests to the Court for advisory
opinions interpreting provisions of the Convention.5 7
Whether the Court should consider de novo the Commis-
sion's findings of fact is less certain. De novo review was nec-
essary in Veldsquez Rodriguez because there were no Commission
findings. The Commission's conclusions were based on the
presumed truth of the petition's allegations, because the gov-
ernment did not adequately respond to requests for informa-
53. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 62(3), at 18, reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
at 692. The European Court of Human Rights notes in its similar system that a case
assumes a judicial character when it is referred to the court. See Lawless Case, 1 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1960).
54. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 41, at 12, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at
686.-
55. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text; see also Inter-Am. Commission
Statute, supra note 7, arts. 18-20, reprijted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 109-11;
American Convention, supra note 2, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 673.
56. American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 34, 52, at 11, 16, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. at 685, 690. For critiques of the Commission's legal analysis, see Shelton,
Improving Human Rights Protections: Recommendations for Enhancing the Effectiveness of the
Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 3 AM. UJ. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 323, 332-34 (1988); Shelton, Abortion and the Right to Lifein the Inter-Ainerican
System: The Case of "Baby Boy, -2 HuM. RTS. L.J. 309 (1981); Weissbrodt, Execution of
Juvenile Offenders by the UInited States Violates International Human Rights. Law, 3 AM. U.J.
INT'L L. & POL'v 339 (1988).
57. The Commission requested three of the Court's nine advisory opinions. See
Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations; Advisory Opinion No. OC-8/87, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 8 (1987); Restrictions to the Death
Penalty, Advisory Opinion No, OC-3/83, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND OPIN-
IONS (ser. A) No. 3 (1983); The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the
American Convention, Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82, INTER-AM. CT. H.R..JUDG-
MENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 2 (1982)..
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tion.58 Although the Court could have deferred to the Com-
mission, adopting its conclusions and estopping Honduras
from contesting the presumed facts, it based its judgment as
much as possible on proof rather than presumption,59 consis-
tent with the practice of other tribunals.6
0
The Court did not decide the standard of review it would
apply if facts remain contested in a proceeding where there is a
detailed Commission report. The practice of other tribunals
varies. The judgments of the ECHR reveal only three cases in
which facts remained disputed following the commission's pro-
ceedings.6" In all three cases the court reviewed the facts,
without explicitly discussing its standard of review.62 In prac-
tice, the court appears to give substantial weight to the com-
58. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. The Court did not decide the
validity of Inter-American Commission Regulation, supra note 7, art. 42. Velisquez
Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 36, 4, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13
(1988). Some states have questioned the legality of the presumption of truth, which
arguably goes beyond a procedural rule and may not be adopted without clear au-
thority in the Convention, however useful it might be as a sanction for non-coopera-
tion. The Court Rules leave open the question of how the Court should proceed in
the event of a party's default. Compare Inter-Am. Court Rules, supra note 7, art. 24,
reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 164, with ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 53, 59
Stat. at 1062, T.S. No. 993, at 32 and Eur. Ct. H.R. Revised Rules, supra note 45, R.
51.
59. Veldsquez Rodriquez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 61, 138. The Court may have
felt that a decision based upon unsubstantiated allegations would be less authorita-
tive and credible than one where the allegations had been fully tested through the
production and evaluation of evidence.
60. In Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, the Permanent Court
of International Justice (the "PCIJ") denied an objection to the admissibility of cer-
tain evidence, stating that "the decision of an international dispute of the present
order should not mainly depend on a point of procedure .... " Free Zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 96,
155-56 (June 7).
61. The first was an interstate proceeding. Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1978). The other two were individual petitions referred to the court, one by the
c6mmission, Artico Case, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980), and the other by the com-
mission and the government, Pakelli Case, 64 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1983).
62. In Northern Ireland, the court considered objections to the commission's fact-
finding procedures and evidence taken. Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7-8, 8.
In a February 11, 1977 order, the court held that it could not rule on the correctness
of the commission's procedures, but that "it is empowered to assess the relevance
and probative value of the evidence so obtained." Id.; see Pakelli, 64 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
15-16, 32-34; Artico, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14-15, 29-30. But see Eur. Ct. H.R.
Revised Rules, supra note 45, R. 29(2).
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mission's findings. 63 Such deference may explain, in part, the
absence of disputed facts before the court; a government is un-
likely to contest commission findings if there is a strong pre-
sumption in their favor.6 4
The ECJ hears actions under several different treaty provi-
sions.6 5 One of these restricts review to the formal validity of
the decision and to the interpretation of the provisions of the
Euratom Treaty, thus apparently precluding factual review.66
In contrast, article 173 of the EEC Treaty authorizes the ECJ
to review an evaluation of the situation, resulting from eco-
nomic facts or circumstances. 67 Similarly, under article 37 of
the ECSC Treaty, the court may determine whether certain of
its commission's decisions are "well-founded. ' 6 In the latter
case, the court is authorized to review de novo and may substi-
tute its own judgment in the matter.69 The court may also re-
view certain commission actions for abuse of discretion. 70
Generally, the question of the standard of review depends on
whether or not the defendant acted pursuant to a provision
granting it sole discretion; as may be expected, the greater the
scope of discretion, the narrower the standard of review. 71
63. See, e.g., Ireland v. UK., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7-8, 8; see also O'Boyle, supra
note 5, at 726.
64. Of course, even at the commission, most cases concern the compatibility of
national legislation with the European Convention's human rights protections. As a
result, issues of fact are infrequently presented.
65. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 172-73, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at
57, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76; Euratom Treaty, supra note 6, art. 18, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1, at 171, 298 U.N.T.S. at 179; ECSC Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 33, 36-37, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2, at 31-33, 261 U.N.T.S. at 167-69.
66. See Euratom Treaty, supra note 6, art. 18, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 171,
298 U.N.T.S. at 179.
67. EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 173, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 57-58, 298
U.N.T.S. at 75-76.
68. ECSC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 37, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2, at 33, 261
U.N.T.S. at 169. These decisions concern the commission's recognition or refusal to
recognize "the existence of a situation which is of such a nature as to provide funda-
mental and persistent disturbances in the economy of a member state." Id.
69. See, e.g., Niederrheinische Bergwerks AG v. High Authority, Joined Cases 2
and 3/60, 1961 E.C.R. 133, 146. Contra Italy v. Commission, Case 13/63, 1963
E.C.R. 165, 182-83, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8014, at 7294 (declining, on the
basis of article 173 of the EEC Treaty, to review an assessment made by the commis-
sion because it was not clearly erroneous).
70. See, e.g., Germany v. Commission, Case 24/62, 1963 E.C.R. 63, 68, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11 8012, at 7254.
71. See G. BEBR, supra note 46, at 125-39; K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 6. at 198-255.
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The basic texts of the Inter-American system do not ex-
plicitly refer to the Court's reviewing the Commission's factual
findings.72 Thus, when presented with this question in a future
case, the Court may choose a standard of review that could
range from giving conclusive effect to the Commission's fac-
tual findings to de novo examination of the facts.
There are several arguments in favor of a broad standard
of review. First, the Commission, the initial fact-finder, be-
comes party to the dispute before the Court and, as a litigant,
is in a position to demonstrate the basis for its conclusions.
Second, if the factual findings of the Commission are given
conclusive effect, the scope of judicial review effectively would
be limited to issues of law. Such a result would be contrary to
the Convention, which grants the Court jurisdiction over "all
cases concerning the interpretation and application of the pro-
visions of this Convention. ' 74 "Cases" include both questions
of law and fact. 75 In addition, limiting the Court to decisions
on law only would be inconsistent with the practice of other
international tribunals.76 Third, the Commission's conclusions
72. Contrast the European Court of Human Rights, whose rules provide that
-[t]he Court shall, whether a case is referred to it by a Contracting Party or by the
Commission, take into consideration the report of the latter." Eur. Ct. H.R. Revised
Rules, supra note 45, R. 29(2). Although this does not establish a standard of review,
it gives some deference to the findings of the commission. This deference clearly
does not amount to giving the commission's findings conclusive effect. In addition to
requiring only that the court "take into consideration" the report of the commission.
the rules envisage a fact-finding role for the court. Rule 31 requires government
assistance "when the Court desires to make or arrange for the making of an investi-
gation on the spot in order to establish the facts or to procure evidence ..... Id. R.
31; see also id. R. 40 (on the taking of evidence by the court).
73. See Inter-Am. Court Statute, supra note 7, art. 28, reprinted m HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 153. Note, in contrast, that the European system does not recognize
its commission as a party to court proceedings. See Eur. Ct. H.R. Revised Rules, supra
note 45, R. 1 (h). The role of a commission in assisting a court has sometimes been
compared to that of the Advocate General in the European Court of Justice. See
O'Boyle, supra note 5, at 726.
74. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 62(3), at 18, reprintted in 9 I.L.M. at
692.
75. In I'eldsquez Rodriguez, the Court cited the "broad terms" of the Convention
in support of its jurisdiction over all issues relevant to a case. Preliminary Objec-
tions, supra note 23, at 41, Ji 29.
76. However, the new court of first instance in the European Communities will
conclusively determine issues of fact. See supra note 6. Establishment of the court of
first instance undoubtedly reflects the heavy caseload of the European Court ofJus-
tice. In 1982 the ECJ delivered 185 judgments. See Everling, The European Cowlt of
Justice as a Decisionmaking .4nthorit), 82 Mien. L. REv. 1294, 1296 (1984). The same
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on disputed facts should be subject to appeal and review by the
Court as a matter of procedural fairness. Lack of review could
undermine the system, which, to be effective, requires deci-
sions based upon authoritative and credible findings. Review
provides an opportunity for a government accused of human
rights violations to challenge initial findings before an in-
dependent judicial body that can review all the evidence in the
case and make a final determination as to the truth of the alle-
gations .77
A highly deferential review of the Commission's factual
findings, based on a standard of substantial evidence or abuse
of discretion, would place the state at a disadvantage by effec-
tively placing the burden of proof on it to overcome the Com-
mission's findings. Although it is normal appellate practice to
presume the correctness of findings and conclusions below,
this result may be inconsistent with the Court's decision in Ve-
ldsquez Rodriguez, which sees the Commission as representing
the petitioner and obliged to prove alleged violations. 7' A
highly deferential review could also raise issues of "procedural
equilibrium and equality of the parties," about which the Court
expresses concern in its opinion.
79
year the European Court of Human Rights had 16 cases submitted to it. See STOCK-
TAKING, supra note 5, at 96. One advisory opinion was requested of the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights in 1983. See Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory
Opinion No. OC-3/83, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A) No. 3
(1983). As the caseloads of human rights tribunals increase, there may be increasing
reliance on their commissions' fact-finding.
77. "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be
heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). One U.S. federal appellate
judge notes that litigants will accept what they may view as a wrong ruling so long as
they feel they have been heard. See Letter from Judge Edward Leavy, Ninth Circuit,
to Dinah L. Shelton (Mar. 1, 1989) (available at the Fordham International Law Journal
office). A further argument for factual review may be based on the American Con-
vention's guarantees regarding fair trial for individuals. Article 8 of the American
Convention establishes minimum standards in this regard. These include the right to
appeal a judgment to a higher court, at least insofar as criminal cases are concerned.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(h), at 4, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 678. While
proceedings before the Inter-American Court are not criminal in nature, and the
Court in Veldsquez Rodriguez expressly rejected the application of certain concepts
found in domestic criminal law, there seems no reason not to afford states a full and
fair hearing before the Court on matters of fact as well as law. Affording such review
may encourage more states to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.
78. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
79. See Vel~squez Rodriquez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 43, 37, OAS/ser.
L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
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Nonetheless, the Commission seems well placed and bet-
ter suited in many cases to undertake investigations and fact-
finding.8 0 For example, it may obtain evidence and testimony
relevant to a particular case during an on-site country investi-
gation. The evidence later may be unavailable or less reliable
due to the passage of time or changed events. In such situa-
tions, the findings of the Commission should be entitled to
deference even when challenged by the state. Thus, while it
would be incorrect to give conclusive effect to the Commis-
sion's findings, it would be problematic to require the Com-
mission to recreate or reestablish all evidence under de novo
review. A standard that gives some weight or deference to the
Commission's findings, but that recognizes the Court's duty to
judge the merits of each case, seems appropriate.8 '
Whatever the standard of review adopted, the scope of in-
quiry by human rights tribunals is wide, because the nature of
human rights cases requires investigating a government's
treatment of alleged victims within its territory or jurisdiction.
In this regard, the Inter-American Court appears prepared to
go further than the ECHR. In order to arrive at its judgment
in Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court reviewed local
laws and practices, including the effectiveness of internal legal
remedies, the role of the police and military, and the acts and
omissions of the government.8 2 It ordered the government to
80. The Commission's most notable achievements in promoting and protecting
human rights have occurred during or as the result of fact-finding and on-site investi-
gation. See T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAS ch. IV (2d ed. 1986).
81. In this context, it is important to distinguish between establishment of the
facts and weighing the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from them. The latter
is an inherent part of the judicial function. See D.V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE IN-
TERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 14-22 (rev. ed. 1975). In situations where the parties agree
on the facts, courts normally do not reopen factual issues. See K.P.E. LASOK, Supra
note 6, at 199. However, at least one court rejected being bound by concessions
made by the parties, viewing the nature of the proceedings before it as neither wholly
accusatorial nor entirely inquisitorial. Id.; see also Andre, Evidence Before the European
Court of Justice, with Special Reference to the Grundig/Consten Decision, 5 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 35, 38 (1967-68).
82. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 49-52, 64-81. The Court
examined procedures of habeas corpus, appeal, cassation, extraordinary writ of
amparo, and declaration of presumptive death, as well as criminal procedures. It
looked not only at the laws, but at the practices in regard to each, including how
many cases of habeas had been granted and denied and on what grounds. Id. Inter-
national tribunals do abstain on issues of interpreting local law. See, e.g., Ringeisen
1989]
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provide an organizational chart showing the structure of an
army battalion and its position within the Honduran armed
forces,83 rejecting the notion that national security reasons
should ]imit the scope of its review.8 4
In comparison, the ECHR has articulated, and frequently
applies, a more limited scope of review. It grants states a
"margin of appreciation," in some cases a "wide margin of ap-
preciation," to determine local practice on such matters as
election laws, obscenity, states of emergency, and military mat-
ters, even where alleged human rights violations are in ques-
tion. 5 While the margin doctrine may be seen as affecting the
standard of review, more properly it should be seen as affect-
ing the scope of review, because it limits judicial inquiry into
matters deemed governed by local law.
The greater amount of review in the Inter-American sys-
tem may result from several factors. First, human rights viola-
tions are more widespread and serious in the Western hemi-
sphere than they are in Western Europe.8 6 Less judicial scru-
tiny in the Inter-American system, thus, could have more
severe consequences than in Europe. Second, the Inter-Amer-
Case, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40, 97 (1971) ("It is not the function of the
European Court to pronounce itself on the interpretation of Austrian law .
83. Vleldsquez Rodriquez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 42, 29-30.
84. Id. at 67, 154.
85. See, e.g., Sporrong and L6nnroth, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982) (economic
policy); Case of Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (national security); Ireland v.
U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (state of emergency); Handyside Case, 24 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976) (obscenity and protection of minors); Case of Engel and
Others, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976) (military matters); De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp
Cases ("Vagrancy" Cases), 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1970) (privacy). No reference
to margin of appreciation appears in the "travaux preparatoirs" (the legislative his-
tory) of the European Convention. The term first appeared in cases dealing with a
state's right to derogate from its obligations under article 15 of the European Con-
vention. See Lawless Case, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1960): Cases of Torture or Mal-
treatment Amounting to Torture Alleged to Have Occurred in Cyprus, 18 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 3 (1959); European Convention, supra note 5, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at
232 (permitting state right to derogate during existence of a public danger threaten-
ing life of the nation, provided measures taken are strictly required by exigencies of
the situation). For an analysis of the Court's application, see Yourow. The argin of
.4ppreciation Doctrine in the DYnamics of Emopean Humian Rights Jurisprudence, 3 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 111 (1987).
86. See Buergenthal, The .merican and European Conventions on Human Rights: Simi-
larities and Differences, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 155, 156 (1980) (noting that existence of non-
democratic regimes and widespread poverty make human rights implementation
more difficult in Western Hemisphere than in Europe). For an overview of the
human rights situation, see INTER-AM. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V./II., doc. 19 (1987-88).
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ican Court came into being nearly three decades after the Eu-
ropean Court and benefited from the history and experience of
the earlier tribunal.8 7 The Inter-American Court is not as cau-
tious and hesitant in its review as the first court seemingly felt
it had to be. Third, the basic texts of the Inter-American sys-
tem are more ambitious than those of the European system,
containing longer and more detailed listings of human rights.
States have thus accepted more obligations subject to judicial
scrutiny. Whatever the mix and weight of these factors in Ve-
ldsquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court announced its ac-
tive role in determining compliance by states parties with their
human rights obligations under the American Convention.
B. Burden of Proof
The allocation of burden of proof can have important con-
sequences affecting the equality of arms of litigants and the
outcome of cases.8 Yet, the concept of burden of proof has
had mixed reception in international tribunals. Many courts
apply the maxim el incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat: It is
for the party who asserts a proposition or a fact to prove it,
regardless of whether the party is nominally applicant or re-
spondent.8 9 Thus, in Diversion of Water from the ieuse, " the Per-
manent Court of International Justice (the "PCIJ") stated that
the Belgian government should have produced evidence re-
garding the facts it alleged. 9 Later, in Temple of Preah Vihearj 2
the ICJ held that because both Cambodia and Thailand based
their claims to the temple on a series of facts and contentions
they asserted, "[t]he burden of proof in respect of these will of
87. The European Convention on Human Rights came into force on September
3, 1953. See European Convention, supra note 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 222 n.l. The court
heard its first case in 1960. See Lawless Case, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1960). The
American Convention on Human Rights came into forceJuly 18, 1978, and the first
matter reached the Court in 1981. See HANDBOOK. supra note 2. For a discussion of
the impact on the Inter-American system of the Convention's entry into force, see T.
BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, supra note 80, at 16-26.
88. See Trindade, Burdeni of Proof with Regard to Exlhaustion of Local Remedies ii iter-
national Law, 9 HUM. RTS. J. 81 (1976).
89. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 25, 30 (Judgment ofJune 27) ("[I]t is of course for the party
appearing to prove the allegations it makes ....").
90. (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 (June 28).
91. Id. at 30.
92. (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of June 15).
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course lie on the Party asserting or putting them forward.'
' 3
In other specific instances, the PCIJ held that an allegation that
the rule of exhaustion of remedies does not apply must be
proved.9 4 Similarly, where it is claimed that a term is used in a
special sense, rather than in its ordinary meaning, the burden
is on the party claiming the special meaning to prove it.9"
The judgments and opinions of the ECJ reveal that in di-
rect actions, both the applicant and the defendant have a duty
to adduce evidence upon which they rely to prove an assertion
of fact.9 6 In addition, the court has the power to call for the
production of evidence. However, the risk of non-persuasion
rests with the applicant, unless the evidence is in the hands of a
party who fails to produce it. 9 7
In contrast to other tribunals, the ECHR states that it re-
jects the concept of burden of proof, although in practice it
requires the applicant's allegations to be proved.98 In Artico,
9 9
93. Id. at 15-16.
94. Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Estonia v. Lithuania), 1939 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B)
No. 76, at 19 (Feb. 28).
95. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B)
No. 53, at 49 (Apr. 5). "If it is alleged by one of the Parties that some unusual or
exceptional meaning is to be attributed to it, it lies on that Party to establish its con-
tention." Id.
96. See, e.g., Ruckdeschel v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen, Joined Cases
117/76 and 16/77, 1977 E.C.R. 1753, 1784, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8457, at
8246. In Duraffour v. Council, Case 18/70, 1971 E.C.R. 515, the court held that the
applicant had the burden of proof that her husband had not committed suicide, in
order to justify a widow's insurance claim; however, the defendant also was bound,
"as the appointing authority, to cooperate ... in order to discover the truth." Id. at
525, 4 31.
97. See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 45/64, 1965 E.C.R. 857, 867, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8038, at 7542 (ECJ shifted burden onto defendant government
after commission challenged certain Italian taxing procedures as violation of article
96 of EEC Treaty). The government asserted the burden was on the commission to
prove that the tax refunds it was making were greater than those authorized by the
Treaty. Id. at 874, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4 8038, at 7548 (opinion of Advocate-
General Gand). However, the information necessary to decide this issue was in the
possession of the Italian government. Id. The court held that the government must
provide the evidence to prove compliance. See also Miller v. Commission, Case
19/77, 1978 E.C.R. 131, 152-53, 44 20-22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4 8439, at
7926 (dismissing application where applicant failed to produce accounts to support
its claim that-fine imposed by commission was unduly burdensome).
98. Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 64, 4 160-161 (1978). In North-
ent Ireland, the court held that it would not rely on the concept that the burden of
proof is borne by one or the other of the two governments concerned. "In the cases
referred to it, the Court examines all the material before it, whether originating from
the Commission, the Parties or other sources, and, if necessary, obtains material
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the applicant provided prima facie evidence. The government
did not expressly contest the truth of the evidence and did not
introduce opposing evidence, arguing that the applicant bore
the burden of proof. 0 The court took the facts as established,
again rejecting the notion of burden of proof, "since neither
the individual applicant nor the Commission has the status of a
party before the Court."''
In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court, in several
instances, explicitly allocated the burden of proof on the par-
ties, discussing the subject in more detail than have other
tribunals. The Court first assigned the burden of proof in con-
sidering the government's preliminary objection on exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies. 10 2 The Court held that the "State
proprio motu." Id. 160. Judge Zekia's separate opinion disagrees with the court that
there is no burden of proof. He said, "surely there is a burden of proof to be dis-
charged in some way or other" in order to determine allegations of human rights
violations. Id. at 100 (separate opinion of Judge Zekia). What is important is by
whom and how such onus should be discharged. Id. Judge Zekia relied on the pre-
sumption of innocence to indicate that there is a burden of proof "required to sub-
stantiate an allegation of contravention of the Convention by the respondent State
.... .Id. at 101. However, "[w]ithholding of evidence and a non-cooperative atti-
tude by a respondent State no doubt might cause the Commission to draw adverse
inferences." Id. at 100. On exhaustion of local remedies, the commission's rules of
procedure originally required the applicant to provide evidence to show that all do-
mestic remedies were exhausted. Eur. Comm'n H.R. Rule 41(2) (1955), reprinied il
1955/1957 Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HUM. RTS. (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) 74. After
much criticism that the rule imposed too heavy a burden, it was amended to require
only prima facie evidence of exhaustion of remedies. 1960 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM.
RTS. (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) 24 ("[Tlhe applicant shall provide information
enabling it to be shown that the conditions laid down in Article 26 of the Convention
have been satisfied."). For a discussion of burden of proof on the question of ex-
haustion of local remedies, see A.A.C. TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF
EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ITS RATIONALE IN THE IN-
TERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 134-72 (1983).
99. Artico Case, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980).
100. Id. at 14, 29.
101. Id. 30 (citations omitted). The court seems to assume that if the state is
the only party before it, there can be no burden of proof, there being no adversary.
102. Article 46 of the American Convention provides that in order for a petition
or communication lodged with the Commission to be admissible, remedies under
domestic law must have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally
recognized principles of international law. This requirement does not apply when
the state does not afford due process of law, the victim is denied access to domestic
remedies or prevented from exhausting them, or there is unwarranted delay in ren-
dering a final judgment. American Convention, sprna note 2, art. 46, at 13, reprinled in
9 I.L.M. at 687. As the Court notes, the rule of exhaustion permits a state to correct
any deficiencies in its performance and avoid an international proceeding. Velasquez
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claiming non-exhaustion has an obligation to prove that do-
mestic remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are ef-
fective.' ' 10 3 However, once the state-which is in the best posi-
tion to indicate available remedies-demonstrates the exist-
ence of specific domestic remedies that should have been
utilized, it is up to the other side to prove exhaustion or that
one of the exceptions to the requirement applies. 10 4
The Court will not presume that there are no effective do-
mestic remedies, because the lack of remedies would place the
state in violation of specific guarantees of the Convention. 105
Instead, the Court examines the remedies indicated by the
government, both in law and as applied, to determine whether
they are adequate-suitable to address an infringement of a
legal right-and effective-capable of producing the result for
which they were designed.' 0 6
On the merits, the Court stated that in principle the bur-
Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 48, 61, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13
(1988).
103. V'eldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 48, 1 59 (quoting Preliminary
Objections, supra note 23, at 53, 88). A similar burden of proof exists in proceed-
ings before the Commission. The Commission's regulations provide that when the
petitioner is unable to prove exhaustion, it is up to the government to demonstrate
that remedies under domestic law have not previously been exhausted. See Inter-Am.
Commission Regulations, supra note 7, art. 37(3), repriated i HANDBOOK, slpi, note 2,
at 129. Similarly, in the European system, the commission held that the government
claiming non-exhaustion must prove the existence of non-exhausted remedies. See
Cyprus Case, 1958-59 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HuM. RTS. (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.)
186, 190-92; see also Alam & Khan v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 116,
133 (1967); Austria v. Italy, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HuM. RTS. (Eur. Comm'n on
Hum. Rts.) 116.
104. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 48, 1 60. In the European
system, exhaustion is required "unless the applicant can show that, in these particu-
lar circumstances, this remedy was unlikely to be effective and adequate in regard to
the grievance in question." .1ustria v. Ialy, 1961 Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HuM. RTs. at
168. Allegations of non-effectiveness must be accompanied by some evidence or
proof. See X v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 34, 34-43 (1970).
105. See I'eldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 48, 60.
106. See id. at 49-50, 64-73. The I'eldsquez Rodrlgiu': Court reviewed the rec-
ord concerning the lack of effective remedies in Honduras during the period in ques-
tion. It found that the evidence showed there were more than 100 persons illegally
detained and, in general, the legal remedies that the government claimed were avail-
able to the victims were ineffective. Id. at 51, 76. The evidence also showed that
reappearances were not due to legal remedies and that lawyers who filed writs of
habeas corpus were intimidated. Id. at 52, } 77-78. The Court noted that the gov-
ernment failed to call witnesses to refute the evidence presented by the Commission.
The government contested some points in oral argument, but the court did not find
that the attorneys presented "convincing evidence to support their arguments." Id.
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den of proof should be on the Commission to establish the
facts supporting its allegations.' 0 7 The Court's decision not
only reflects the general practice of international tribunals, but
is correct in principle. The fundamental norm pacta sunt ser-
vanda should carry with it a presumption that states not only
should, but do, carry out their obligations in good faith. This
implies a presumption of innocence when violations of interna-
tional law are alleged, regardless of the organization or re-
gion. 108
As to how the burden of proof could be discharged, the
Commission argued, and both the government and the Court
agreed, that the burden could be discharged in this case by
indirect or circumstantial evidence including inferences and
presumptions.' 0 9 The Court held that proof of an official prac-
tice of disappearances carried out or tolerated by the govern-
ment, plus evidence linking the disappearance of an individual
to that practice, would be sufficient to prove the violation, pro-
vided the proof had sufficient weight to meet the standard es-
tablished by the Court.1 t1
Although the Court placed the initial burden on the Com-
mission, it recognized the difficulties of applying this principle
when the necessary evidence is in the control of the defending
government and cannot be obtained without the government's
cooperation.' The Court's solution to this problem is to shift
to the government the burden of producing evidence to refute
the petitioner's allegations.' 12 Failure to come forward may
cause the Court to presume from the government's silence that
the allegations are true. 113
79. The Court thus concluded that Honduran remedies were ineffective during the
period in question.
107. Id. at 59, 123.
108. See Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 100 (1978) (separate opin-
ion of Judge Zekia).
109. f'eldsquez Rodrigue-, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 60, 124-126.
110. Id. 1 126.
111. Id. at 61, 136-137.
112. See id. 138.
113. See id. Compare the ICJ decision in Coifu Channel where the court held that
the mere fact of control over territory where an alleged violation of international law
has occurred is not sufficient to shift the burden of proof, which remains on the state
alleging an international law violation. However, a mere denial or statement of igno-
rance is an insufficient response and if direct proof is unavailable due to lack of'coop-
eration by the defendant state, the court may place greater reliance on inferences of'
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This shifting of the burden represents one of the major
developments in the case. While the burden in a few cases may
be heavy, 14 in most cases it reflects the reality of human-rights
litigation. Individual petitioners and the Commission are not
on equal footing with the government, lacking both the re-,
sources and the power of the defendant state. In addition,
state sovereignty precludes the Commission and the Court
from on-site investigation or acquisition of evidence without
the state's consent.' 15  Thus, it seems appropriate for the
Court to require the state to produce evidence in its exclusive
control.' 16
C. Degree of Proof
The Inter-American Court notes that none of its docu-
ments establish a standard of proof and that in practice, inter-
national tribunals have avoided a rigid rule regarding the
amount of proof necessary to support a judgment.' 17 Most in-
ternational courts do not explicitly discuss the degree of proof
required to sustain a judgment; where they do, the decisions
fact and circumstantial evidence. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 1, 18
(Judgment of Apr. 9). Also, in .1Iinquiers and Ecrehos, the court held that "each party
has to prove its alleged title and the facts upon which it relies." Minquiers and
Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 52 (Judgment of Nov. 17). When the govern-
ment of Britain did not produce documents on which its title was based, the court
said, "[a]s these documents are not produced, it cannot be seen on what ground the
Judgment was based. It is therefore not possible to draw from this Judgment any
conclusion supporting the British claim to the Minquiers." Id. at 68.
114. If the state can only escape responsibility by itself proving the circum-
stances in which the alleged violation occurred, it may place serious demands on
governments whose degree of control over the 'territory is uncertain. Without the
strict proof requirements the Court imposes, before an inference of state responsibil-
ity will be created, the burden could be very difficult to discharge, and could limit the
willingness of states to accept the Court's jurisdiction.
115. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Commission Statute, supra note 7, art. 18(g), reprinted in
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 110.
116. Similar results are obtained in cases whereonly one party is present before
the court and evidence to prove the appli'cant's claims remain in the hands of the
absent party. In Iranian Hostages, the ICJ noted the position of the United States,
which claimed it had been unable to have access to its diplomatic and consular repre-
sentatives, premises, and archives in Iran "and that in consequence it has been un-
able to furnish detailed factual evidence on some matters." United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 9, I (Judgment of May
24). The court accepted. proof based upon press reports, statements by Iranian and
U.S. officials, and verified pleadings.
117. See Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 60, 127. OAS/ser.
L./V./III 19, doc. 13 (1988); see K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 6, at 262.
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are inconsistent. For example, the ICJ is guided, in unopposed
cases, by article 53, which obliges the court to find that the
applicant's claims are "well-founded in fact and in law.' l l In
considering Nicaragua's claim against the United States, the
court clarified that the degree of proof required in unopposed
cases is the same as that of contested proceedings, i.e., that the
claim is "sound in law" and "that the facts on which it is based
are supported by convincing evidence."'
19
In the ECJ, reference has been made to "full proof"; 2 0 to
"sufficiently weighty, clear and uncontradictory circumstantial
evidence [that] is not contradicted by contrary circumstantial
evidence"; 2 1 and to a "reasonable degree of certainty."'' 22 In
other words, the standard of proof is not settled.
The ECHR, in Northern Ireland, applied a standard of "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" in finding human rights violations,
noting that this was the standard of proof the commission
adopted when evaluating the material it obtained.1 23 The Irish
government argued that the standard was too rigid, particu-
larly where the responding state has failed to be fully coopera-
tive with the commission and court. 124 The court followed the
commission's approach, but added that such proof may follow
from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear, and concor-
dant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact.
"In this context, the conduct of the Parties when evidence is
being obtained has to be taken into account. '"125
Neither the European commission nor the court gave an
explanation for adopting the highest standard of proof. How-
ever, the Northern Ireland holding was based upon an earlier
commission decision involving an interstate complaint alleging
an administrative practice of torture and ill-treatment in
118. ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 53, 59 Stat. at 1062, T.S. No. 993, at 32.
119. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 24, 29 (Judgment ofJune 27).
120. Netherlands v. High Authority, Case 6/54, 1954-1956 E.C.R. 103, 115.
121. Duraffour v. Council, Case 18/70, 1971 E.C:R. 515, 525, 30.
122. Acciaierie e Ferrier6 Pugliesi v. High Authority, Case 8/65, 1966 E.C.R. 1,
12.
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Greece.'2 ' The commission stated that for the purposes of
that case, it must maintain a certain standard of proof, which
was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 27
Northern Ireland also involved an interstate complaint alleg-
ing widespread ill-treatment. The fact that both of these com-
plaints concerned systematic violations of non-derogable
rights may have influenced the commission and the court.
Moreover, there are always suspicions of political motivation
when interstate complaints are filed. Under these circum-
stances, the supervisory bodies may have felt the need to im-
pose the highest standard of proof, which might not apply in
other situations. Notably, in at least one individual petition,
the court has decided in favor of an applicant on the basis of
proof that the court recognized did not meet the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 28
In l/eldsquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court noted that
international proceedings are less formal than domestic litiga-
tion. However, it appeared to adopt a domestic law principle
that the degree of proof should depend on the nature, charac-
ter, and seriousness of the case. Given the "special serious-
ness" of the allegations in Veldsquez Rodriguez, which involved a
policy of toleration of disappearances, the Court required that
the proof be "capable of establishing the truth of the allega-
tions in a convincing manner."' 2 9 The Court's opinion left
open the possibility that other degrees of proof may be re-
quired in other types of cases.
The "clear and convincing" standard seems appropriate
where systematic and serious violations of human rights are al-
leged in individual petitions. Where the allegations are less
serious, the Court could accept a showing by a preponderance
of the evidence, although the Veldsquez Rodriguez opinion does
not clearly state this. A standard of beyond a reasonable doubt
is generally not appropriate because, as the Court notes, these
126. See Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HuN!. RTS. (Eur. Comm'n on
Hum. Rts.) 1, 196.
127. Id.
128. See Pakelli Case, 64 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1983). Similarly, in the
Winterwerp Case, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981), the court held that a person
should not be deprived of liberty unless "he has been reliably shown to be of un-
sound mind." Id. at 18, 1 39.
129. Vekisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35. 60. 129, OAS/ser.
L/V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
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are not criminal proceedings. "The objective of international
human rights law is not to punish those individuals who are
guilty of violations, but rather to protect the victims and to
provide for the reparation of damages resulting from the acts
of the States responsible."'' 3 0 Furthermore, a criminal stan-
dard would be unduly burdensome for most individual appli-
cants. Possibly, the Court might consider it in an interstate
case, as has the European Court,' 3 1 where concerns of political
motivation need to be alleviated. However, even in such cir-
cumstances, the implication of criminality probably should be
avoided.
D. Admissibility and Weighing of Evidence
The rule that international tribunals are not bound to ad-
here to strict judicial rules of evidence finds more frequent
statement in the cases than any other rule of evidence.13 2
Rules of evidence are drawn from the basic texts of each tribu-
nal-the treaty, statute, and rules of court-as well as from
customary law and general principles of law, including the
practice of municipal and international tribunals.
The practice at the ICJ has been to admit all evidence, but
to establish principles for excluding certain matters from con-
sideration after being admitted, giving lowered value to some
evidence, and giving stronger consideration to other proofs.
"The International Court of Justice has construed the absence
of restrictive rules in its Statute to mean that a party may gen-
erally produce any evidence as a matter of right, so long as it is
produced within the time limits fixed by the Court."' 3 3 As did
its predecessor, the court rejects technical rules, believing that
the decision of an international dispute "should not mainly de-
pend on a point of procedure." ' 134
The court has stated that, in principle, it is not bound to
confine its consideration "to the material formally submitted
to it by the parties.""'3 5 Thus, although international courts ap-
130. Id. at 61, 11 134.
131. See Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
132. See 1).\. SANDIFER, supra note 81, at 9.
133. Id. at 184.
134. See Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District ofGex (Fr. v. Swil z.). 1932
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 96, 155-56 une 7).
135. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
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ply the concept of burden of proof and rely upon the litigants
to substantiate their claims, the tribunals also actively seek evi-
dence in appropriate cases. In this way, international courts
may be seen to combine the common law adversarial system
with the civil law practice of judicial inquiry. 136 For example,
the ECJ may order a measure of inquiry, although the burden
lies on the parties in the first instance to indicate the steps nec-
essary to investigate an issue of fact by setting up their own
cases and producing their own evidence. 3 7 A contention must
be supported by sufficient evidence or indications to make out
a prima facie case, before the ECJ will order additional inquiry
to be made. ' 8 If a party refrains from producing evidence in
its possession or at its disposal, the court may conclude that
the contention is not supported by sufficient evidence to justify
a measure of inquiry. 139
The ICJ accepts that in addition to evidence actually sub-
mitted, it may take note of statements of representatives of the
parties or of other states in international organizations, as well
as resolutions adopted or discussed by such organizations, in-
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 25, 30 (Judgment of June 27) (citing Payment in Gold of the
Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Switz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos.
20-21. at 124 (July 12); Nuclear Test (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 263-64, 31-32
(judgment of Dec. 20)); see also ICJ Statute, supr note 4, art. 50, 59 Stat. at 1062, T.S.
No. at 993, at 32. The European Court of Human Rights has a provision identical to
that of the ICJ.
136. See D.V. SANDIFER, supra note 81, at 176-79; supra note 45 and accompany-
ing text.
137. See, e.g., SNUPAT v. High Authority, Joined Cases 42 and 49/59, 1961
E.C.R. 53, where an intervener based argument on the wording of a contract that it
did not produce because it was confidential. The court held that since the intervenor
was relying on a document in its own possession, it should have introduced proof of
its allegations by disclosing it. Id. at 84-85. "I't is not acceptable to rely on the Court
to take the initiative in obtaining for itself by measures of inquiry information in-
tended to prove the cogency of the argument relied upon by the intervener, which
itself possesses that information." Id. at 84. Similarly, in Gualco v. Commission,
Case 14/64, 1965 E.C.R. 51, the court rejected as unfounded a series of arguments
made by an applicant who did not produce any documents to support the assertions
alleged. Id. at 59-60. Having not made a prima facie case, the court held there was
no need to order the measures of inquiry suggested by the applicant. Id. All the
evidence had in fact been in her possession or at her disposal. Id. See K.P.E. LAsoK,
supra note 6, at 216.
138. See Prakash v. Commission, Joined Cases 19 and 65/63, 1965 E.C.R. 533,
554.
139. See, e.g., ILFO v. High Authority, Case 51/65, 1966 E.C.R. 87, 96 (appli-
cant's failure to offer evidence t6 justify request for measure of inquiry 'resulted in
rejection of such request).
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sofar as factually relevant, whether or not such material has
been drawn to its attention by a party.14
,Although freely admitting evidence, equality of the parties
remains the basic principle of the court. In Nicaragua, the
court noted the need to balance its receipt of communications
by an absent party, whose views it is valuable to know in
whatever form those views may have been expressed, with this
principle. Thus, although the court will admit for considera-
tion informal communications by an absent party, "[t]he treat-
ment to be given by the Court ... must be determined by the
weight to be given to these different considerations, and is not
susceptible of rigid definition in the form of a precise general
rule." '14 1
The Rules of the ECHR provide that the court may "ob-
tain any evidence which it considers capable of providing clari-
fication on the facts of the case."1 42 It may do this on its own
motion, at the request of a party, the commission, the appli-
cant, or a third party invited or granted leave to submit written
comments. 4  The court may also "decide to hear as a witness
or expert or in any other capacity any person whose evidence
or statements seem likely to assist it in the carrying out of its
task."' 14 4 The court may also delegate one or more of its mem-
bers to conduct an inquiry, carry out an investigation on the
140. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986
I.CJ. 4, 44, 72 (Judgment ofJune 27). Declarations of states may be regarded as
evidence of the truth of facts, as evidence that such facts are attributable to the states
making the declarations, and, to a lesser degree, as evidence for the legal qualifica-
tion of these facts. Id.
141. Id. at 26, 31.
142. Eur. Ct. H.R. Revised Rules, supra note 45, R. 40(1).
143. See id.
144. Id. Compare the procedures of the ECJ. Its rules provide that at the close
of pleadings the court "shall prescribe the measures of enquiry that it considers ap-
propriate by means of an order setting out the issues of fact to be determined" after
hearing the views of the advocate-general. ECJ Rules of Procedure, supra note 45,
art. 45, § 1, at 13. The court may require the parties, their representatives or agents,
or the governments of member states to produce all documents and supply all infor-
mation that it considers desirable. Id. § 2 (stating that such requirements are without
prejudice to articles 24 and 25 of the ECSC Statute, articles 21 and 22 of the EEC
Statute, or articles 22 and 23 of the Euratom Statute). In addition the court may
entrust "any individual, body, authority, committee or other organisation it chooses"
with the task of' giving an expert opinion or holding an enquiry. Protocol on the
Code of the Court ofJustice, Apr. 18. 1951, art. 25, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd.
5189) -, 115 (official English version), 261 U.N.T.S. 247, 259 (unofficial English
trans.).
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spot, or take evidence in some other manner. 4 5 Although the
rules provide for the possibility of objection to a witness or
expert, they state that the court "may hear for the purpose of
information a person who cannot be heard as a witness."'' 46
In practice, the ECHR has expressed a rule of liberality
consistent with the practice of the ICJ. In Northern Ireland, the
court stated that it
is not bound, under the Convention or under the general
principles applicable to international tribunals, by strict
rules of evidence. In order to satisfy itself, the Court is enti-
tled to rely on evidence of every kind, including, insofar as
it deems them relevant, documents or statements emanat-
ing from governments, be they respondent or applicant, or
from their institutions or officials. 147
In Vlelasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Commission
presented twelve witnesses; five more were listed but did not
appear.' 4 ' The Court on its own ordered the production of
further documentary and testimonial evidence. In ruling on
the government's preliminary objection on failure to exhaust
domestic remedies, the Court stated that it was using "all the
evidence before it, including that presented during the pro-
ceedings on the merits."' 49
Documentary evidence was accepted as valid, "particularly
because the parties did not oppose or object to those docu-
ments nor did they question their authenticity or veracity."'' 50
In addition to testimony, the Court accepted press clippings as
a means of corroborating the testimony and documentary evi-
dence.15' The Court viewed some items as a manifestation of
145. Eur. Ct. H.R. Revised Rules, supra note 45, R. 40(4).
146. Id. R. 43. The rules do not indicate the grounds on which objection (recu-
sation) may be made. None of the court's decisions refer to an objection being made.
147. Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 79, 4 209 (1978).
148. Veldisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 40-41, 28(a)-(f),
OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988). One of the five was murdered after being
summoned to testify while another witness was killed after giving his testimony. Id. at
43-44, 4 40-41.
149. Id. at 47, 51.
150. Id. at 62, 140.
151. Id. at 56, 59, 63, 4 106, 119, 146. Compare ranian Hostages, where the ICJ
stated that the essential facts of the case were "matters of public knowledge" that had
received extensive coverage in the world press and in radio and television broadcasts
from Iran and other countries. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Te-
bran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 9, 12 (judgment of May 24). The court accepted
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"public and well-known facts which, as such, do not require
proof." '152 Others had evidentiary value in themselves insofar
as they textually reproduced public statements of government
officials.' 53 Others were viewed as corroborating witness testi-
mony.' 54 In this regard, the Court noted the practice of both
international and domestic courts of accepting direct evidence,
both testimonial and documentary, and indirect evidence-cir-
cumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions. The Court
noted that in cases of repression characterized by attempts to
suppress information, circumstantial or presumptive evidence
becomes especially important. 155
Press clippings and extracts from books received less
favorable treatment in Nicaragua where the ICJ treated such
material, whether submitted by Nicaragua or by the United
States, "with great caution." 156 Even where the court saw the
material as meeting high standards of objectivity, the court
stated it "regards press reports not as evidence capable of
proving facts, but considers that they can nevertheless contrib-
ute, in some circumstances, to corroborating the existance of a
particular fact,"' 5 7 as illustrative material additional to other
sources of evidence. Additionally, the court took the view that
press information could establish public knowledge "and the
Court can attach a certain amount of weight to such public
knowledge.' 1 8 However, the court indicated that it will show
particular caution because reports may all turn out to be based
on a single source.159
press reports, noting that the United States Memorial contained a "statement of Ver-
ification" from a high-ranking U.S. official that "to the best of his knowledge and
belief the facts there stated are true." Id. at 10, 12. These included U.S. transla-
tions into English of Iranian news reports. The court noted that it necessarily had to
rely on these sources because of the lack of participation by Iran. It also noted that
all the information had been communicated to the Iranian government "without hav-
ing evoked from that Government any denial or questioning of the facts alleged
before the Court by the United States." Id. 13.
152. V'eldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 63, 146.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 60-61, 131.
156. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 40, 62 (Judgment of June 27).
157. Id. at 79, 143.
158. Id. at 40, 63.
159. Id.
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While all international courts freely admit evidence, they
use a variety of principles to evaluate the evidence submitted.
For example, in Nicaragua, the ICJ gave considerable signifi-
cance to the declarations made by the authorities of the states
concerned. 6  The court followed what it calls the general
practice of courts in giving "superior credibility" to two kinds
of evidence: first, that of disinterested witnesses-those who
are not parties to the proceedings and stand to gain or lose
nothing from its outcome-and "so much of the evidence of a
party as is against its own interest."' 16' Where the case involves
armed conflict, testimony by a member of the government of a
state party to the litigation will be utilized when it may be re-
garded as contrary to the interests or contentions of the state
to which the witness owes allegiance or as relating to matters
not controverted. 162
The ECHR similarly evaluates the probative quality of evi-
dence. The court weighs the relevance and value of each item,
noting where the absence of cross-examination of interested
witnesses may affect that value. In Northern Ireland, the court
held that it would assess the relevance and probative value of
evidence obtained by the commission, placing particular
weight on objective medical testimony and less on the views of
interested witnesses.' 63
On questions of admissibility, international practice shows
that when evidence is challenged, the burden is upon the party
challenging it to show that the evidence should be excluded on
the basis of a specific ground requiring such action.'" 4 In Nica-
ragua, Nicaragua attempted to exclude from consideration a
160. Id. at 41, 64.
161. Id. at 42-43, T 69.
162. Id. at 43, 70.
For the rest, while in no way impugning the honour or veracity of the Minis-
ters of either Party who have given evidence, the Court considers that the
special circumstances of this case require it to treat such evidence with great
reserve. The Court believes this approach to be the more justified in view of
the need to respect the equality of the parties in a case where one of them is
no longer appearing; but this should not be taken to mean that the non-
appearing party enjoys a priori a presumption in its favour.
Id.
163. Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 79-80, 77 209-210 (1978).
164. In V'eldsquez Rodriguez, the Court stated that a party challenging a witness
has the burden of refuting the witness' testimony. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. 35, 62, 141, OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
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U.S. State Department document that was published to justify
U.S. Central American policy.' 65 The publication was not sub-
mitted to the court in any formal manner contemplated by the
statute and rules of the court. 66 However, it was sent to an
official of the registry to be made available to the court. 1 67 Nic-
aragua did not attempt to counter the publication, claiming
that it could not be considered evidence because it was not
properly before the court. 168 However, the court considered
that "in view of the special circumstances of this case, it may,
within limits, make use of information in such a publica-
tion."1 69
Hearsay testimony is generally admitted, but is given little,
if any, weight. In Corfu Channel, the ICJ rejected consideration
of the testimony of one witness, stating that "the facts stated
by the witness from his personal knowledge are not sufficient
to prove what the United Kingdom Government considered
them to prove."' 7 ° Since the witness was relying on third-
party hearsay, the' court would treat it as no more than an alle-
gation. "A charge of such exceptional gravity against a State
would require a degree of certainty that has not been reached
here."171
In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the government objected on several
occasions to the admissibility of testimony, based on article 37
of the Court's rules.' 72 One objection asserted that a witness
had deserted the Armed Forces and had violated his military
oath. 1 73 Another witness was challenged because, as the sister
of the victim, she was a party interested in the outcome. 7 , In
both these cases; the Court unanimously rejected the objec-
165. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.





170. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 1.C.J. 1, 16 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
171. Id. at 17.
172. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 56-57, 101, 110,
OAS/ser. L./V./1II. 19, doc. 13 (1988). Article 37 of the Inter-American Court Rules
allows the Court to "decide any dispute arising from an objection to a witness or
expert." Inter-Am. Court Rules, supra note 7, art. 37, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, at 168.
173. V'eldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 56, 101.
174. Id. at 57, 110.
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tions. 1' The Court noted that the government had attacked
the impartiality and honesty of some witnesses and had as-
serted that a criminal record made others incompetent to tes-
tify. 176 "They even insinuated that testifying against the State
in these proceedings was disloyal to the nation.' ' 177 However,
the government presented no concrete evidence to rebut the
witnesses' testimony, which the Court held it had the burden
to do. 178 Therefore, the testimony could not be ignored. The
Court further specifically rejected the government's allegations
that a criminal record or pending charges or an interest in the
case is sufficient to deny competence to testify. 179 Finally, the
Court found the allegations of disloyalty for testifying "unac-
ceptable," because "human rights are higher values" that are
not derived from nationality.'" °
In addition to objecting to the admissibility of testimony
because of bias or untruthfulness, the government challenged
other evidence as hearsay and attacked the credibility of wit-
nesses. The Court treated these objections as going to the
weight and not the admissibility of the evidence presented.' 8 '
Witness testimony was also evaluated by the ICJ in Nicara-
gua. 182 The court noted that the failure of the United States to
participate created two particular disadvantages. 83 First,
there was no cross-examination, even though the judges exten-
sively questioned those appearing. 84 Second, there were no
defense witnesses. 85 The court specifically excluded consider-
ation of opinion testimony. 8 6 It considered only statements of
fact. 1 8 7 "An opinion expressed by a witness is a mere personal
and subjective evaluation of a possibility, which has yet to be
shown to correspond to a fact; it may, in conjunction with
175. See id. at 56-57, 1 101, 111.
176. Id. at 53-54, 56-58, 11 86, 88, 90, 92, 101, 110, 116.
177. Id. at 62, 1 142.
178. Id. at 63, 1 143.
179. Id. 11 142-143.
180. Id. 144.
181. Id. at 52-59, 11 82-118.
182. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 4, 41-42, 66 (Judgment of June 27).
183. Id. at 42, 67.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. T 68.
187. Id.
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other material, assist the Court in determining a question of
fact, but is not proof in itself."' 8
In general, then, the Inter-American Court follows the
practice of other international tribunals in seeking to obtain
the maximum relevant evidence upon which to base a decision.
It specifically rejects exclusionary rules, while enforcing its
own rules of procedure. It strongly upholds the rights of indi-
viduals to bring petitions and to testify against their own gov-
ernment concerning human rights abuses. Such practice is
consistent with the dual functions of the Court to investigate
allegations of human rights violations and to interpret and ap-
ply the Convention.
E. Presumptions and Judicial Notice
In deciding Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court,
like other international courts, applied certain presumptions
and took judicial notice of facts commonly accepted. Judicial
notice is often taken in matters of international law. In Nicara-
gua, the ICJ held that "the Court is not solely dependent on
the argument of the parties before it with respect to the appli-
cable law."' 8 9 In another decision, the ICJ stated that it, "as an
international judicial organ, is deemed to take judicial notice of
international law, and is therefore required ... to consider on
its own initiative all rules of international law which may be
relevant to the settlement of the dispute.' '9 0 However, the
court noted that the views of parties to a case as to the law
applicable to their dispute are very material, particularly where
the views are in agreement. 1
As for presumptions, the Inter-American Court found that
presumptive or circumstantial evidence is especially important
where there are allegations of disappearances.'19 2 The most
188. Id.
189. Id. at 24, 29 (citation omitted).
190. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice., Fed. Rep. of Germany v. Ice.), 1974
I.C.J. 3, 9, 17. But see Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-78 (Judgment
of Nov. 20) (requiring proof of regional custom). In the ECJ, community law may' be
proved by reference to the official texts of the instruments or by reference to the
Official Journal. See K.P.E. LAsOK, supra note 6, at 198.
191. Militaqy and Paramilitary Activities in and Against .Vicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 25,
29.
192. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 60-61, 1131, OAS/ser.
L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
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important presumption articulated in this case is the presump-
tion of truth of unrefuted allegations.19 3 As the Court noted,
international proceedings are not criminal cases and interna-
tional tribunals are not required to apply criminal proce-
dures.'9 4 The objective of a human rights proceeding is to
protect victims and compensate for the damages resulting
from wrongful state action. 95 Therefore, the burden of proof
on the applicant will be balanced by recognition that the duty
to present evidence cannot be applied where that evidence is
within the control of the state. If the state controls the means
to verify acts, its silence or evasiveness may be interpreted as
an acknowledgment of the truth of the allegations, so, long as
the contrary is not indicated by the record or not compelled as
a matter of law.
Cases in which one side fails to participate are generally
not as authoritative as ones in which all the facts and allega-
tions on both sides have been fully presented to the court for
determination. Mindful of this, the Inter-American Court took
steps to avoid having a decision based upon liability derived
from silence.' 96 The Court noted that part of the reason it ad-
193. In Iranian Hostages, the ICJ noted the lack of denial by Iran and its silence in
finding the allegations by the United States well-founded, based on article 53 of the
ICJ Statute. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3, 9-10, 4 11-13 (Judgment of May 24). The European Court of Human
Rights has no equivalent of article 53, nor do its rules apply a presumption of truth.
The court must simply render a decision in case of default by a party. See Eur. Ct.
H.R. Revised Rules, supra note 45, R. 51.
194. See 'eldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 61, 134. This is said to be
especially true of human rights proceedings. Id. 4 134-135.
195. Id. 134.
196. Id. 138. In Nicaragua, the ICJ also made an effort to avoid a decision
based solely on silence. The court expressed concern to maintain the equality of the
parties and the sound administration of justice especially when one of the parties is
absent. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 4,
39-40, 59 (Judgment ofJune 27). In this regard, it has freedom in estimating the
value of the various elements of evidence, though "general principles of judicial pro-
cedure necessarily govern the determination of what can be regarded as proved." Id.
at,40, 60. The court applied the principle of admissions against interest, finding
that statements by high-ranking official political figures "are of particular probative
value when they acknowledge facts or conduct unfavourable to the State represented
by the person who made them. They ma, then be construed as a form of admission."
Id. at 41, 64. The ICJ does indicate caution on this: It notes where the statements
appear, whether the citation is in the original language or in translation, and how it
came to the attention of the court. Id. 65. Nicaragua attempted to use the U.S.
argument, but found that certainly the U.S. position could be seen as a recognition of
the "imputability of some of the activities complained of." Id. at 45, 74.
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mitted all the evidence and ordered more was to compensate
for the lack of evidence presented by Honduras and to avoid a
decision based solely on a presumption of truth from silence.
The Court referred to its discretion to apply the presumption
from silence as well as its "duty to evaluate the evidence as a
whole."'' 9 7 Its decision reflects both principles.'"8
EVAL UA TION AND CONCLUSIONS
The function of evidence is "to enable the tribunal to dis-
cover the truth concerning the conflicting claims of the parties
before it."' 99 In human rights litigation the situation is some-
what different. The primary purpose is less to resolve disputes
than to ensure that states comply with their obligations to re-
spect and ensure the, rights protected in the conventions they
have ratified. While in domestic law the court is a neutral refe-
ree between contesting parties, each of whom is responsible
for the conduct of the case, in. the international arena, tribu-
nals also draw upon the civil law model of courts of inquiry or
investigation.
The main factor involved in most international litigation is
that it involves sovereign states whose cooperation is essential
for the functioning of the system. These states may have ex-
clusive control over the territory where the evidence is to be
found and over the individuals bringing the claims. This re-
quires imposing a burden on the state to produce evidence in
question.
Evidentiary and procedural rules in international litigation
have been characterized by their flexibility, if not by their non-
existence. Certain characteristics flow from this and from the
197. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 61, 138.
198. In a recent order issued in a companion case to leldsquez Rodriguez, the
Court reiterated its concern that the state cooperate in producing evidence and
stressed the consequences of a failure to do so. Fair~n Garbi and Solis Corrales
Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (Order ofJan. 20, 1989). The Court notes that states par-
ties to the Convention have pledged to cooperate and to investigate situations involv-
ing possible violations of rights protected by the Convention. On this basis it or-
dered Honduras to exhume and identify within thirty days a body found in a particu-
lar location in the country. The Court observed that "the lack of cooperation of the
parties to a case in providing proof that is under their control constitutes a failure of
their legal duty in achieving the object and purpose of the Convention, capable of
creating a presumption against the party in question." Id.
199. D.V. SANDIFER, supra note 81, at 1.
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demands of hearing disputes involving sovereign states.
Human rights cases do not, in reality, involve equality of arms.
There is a need to ensure that the tribunals are able to obtain
the necessary evidence to make a determination on the merits.
This cannot be done without the cooperation of the state in
question. For this reason human rights tribunals may more
readily apply a presumption of truth from a state's failure to
cooperate.
Evidentiary flexibility, which is valued for its assistance in
fact-finding, must still be balanced by sufficient predictability
to guarantee fair procedures. Clearly articulated standards
must be established for the production of evidence and stan-
dards of proof that will assist individuals, commissions, and
governments in preparing meritorious cases, and that will also
ensure credible, authoritative decisions that no state can ig-
nore.
Thus, while the need for flexibility remains, predictability
and fairness are of equal concern. Procedures should not
change from case to case. Both states and individuals whose
rights are at stake should have clear guidance on procedures,
as well as on substance of human rights obligations. In this
respect, the guidelines given by the Inter-American Court will
be useful in future cases. The guidelines clearly indicate to
those claiming violations the degree and kind of proof neces-
sary to challenge state action in cases similar to this. The
guidelines are sufficiently deferential to states to avoid unnec-
essary intervention, but they put a sufficient burden on the
state, such that it cannot hide behind evidence in its control.
Further refinements of these principles and development of
others can be sought in future decisions of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and other international tribunals.
